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While research about cooperation incentives for mobile ad hoc networks
(MANETs) is done only for a relative short period, there exists tremendous
knowledge in the economic and social areas. Based on a new categorization
of incentive patterns, we examine the relevant properties of each pattern and
demonstrate their respective design alternatives and occurring challenges for
the application to ad hoc networks. With a focus on trade based patterns, we
found that negotiation about actions proves to be very complex or inefficient
in MANETs. Another approach, the introduction of an artificial currency,
also implies several problems like how to equip the entities with means of
payment and how to secure liquidity. As a novelty, we introduce a new kind
of incentive pattern following the concept of company shares. It suits well for
MANETs because it can be shown that through the creation of individual
currencies the above mentioned problems disappear.
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1  Introduction 
Due to the absence of infrastructure in mobile ad hoc networks, communication and service 
provision depends on the cooperation of the participating devices themselves. In economic and 
social life, there are multiple possibilities to remunerate someone in exchange for a certain service. 
Often, it is not possible to gather full information about the execution of a task. To ensure that an 
agent acts in favor of the principal in spite of this lack of control, their benefit should depend on 
similar conditions. Hence both profit from better execution. The well examined Principal/Agent-
Theory addresses these issues in depth. The aim is to find an optimal balance between positive 
incentive effects and the costs for the applied incentive measures (Laux 1998). 
These principles are also applicable to ad hoc networks, though there exist some specific 
characteristics which differ from the physical world as well as the conventional client/server 
networks, e.g. the lack of persistent entities, roles and hierarchies. For instance, the possibility that 
an agent executes a service well is much higher if she has confidence that she can consume equal 
resources. Additionally, a principal will not be lavish with someone else's resources if this leads to 
effective counter-measures or draining of remuneration resources. 
A systematic overview of incentive patterns is presented in Obreiter et al (2003a, 2003b). We 
continue and extend this exposition. I.e., we introduce several new aspects, examine in more depth 
the applicability of individual incentive patterns and emphasize their challenges and limits. Starting 
with the general aspects in Chapter 2 we present our results about trust and trade based patterns in 
the following sections (Chapter 3 and 4 respectively). The introduction of the share pattern in 
Chapter 5 is another major contribution of this paper. Finally, in the context of a case study 
(Chapter 6), we demonstrate how to choose an appropriate incentive pattern for a discovery overlay, 
considering our results and insights.
2  General Considerations 
2.1 Aspects for Economic Incentives 
Motivation: An optimal incentive pattern should provide conditions, such that the individual utility 
maximization leads to maximal total utility of a community. Therefore it is important that the agent 
profits directly from putting more effort into his work.
Efficiency: But the costs of an incentive system has to be considered well. Controlling, 
administration and the remuneration itself have to be balanced with the positive effects. A general 
rule is that only if additional investment in such a system gains more additional utility it should be 
enhanced.
Examples:  There are very different kinds of incentives, which can easily be found in the social and 
economic area: Authorities want their people to smoke less or companies to produce safer products. 
So they tax tobacco or pass a law for extended liabilities concerning new products. People pay for 
the service of specialists in means of money. In clubs, those who own an honorary post are 
remunerated with titles and a high reputation. (Tab.1) 
Principal Agent Aim Incentive Measure 
State Company Safety of products Extended Liability  
Company Manager Revenue Maximization Revenue Participation 
Table 1 Examples 
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2.2 Aspects for the Application to Ad hoc Networks 
In the following, we discuss three aspects for the application to ad hoc networks. In the appendix, 
more aspects can be found.
Occasionally online networks (OON): There are two extreme models: the pure mobile ad hoc 
network (MANET) and the infrastructure based network like the internet. The big advantage of the 
first is their independent applicability and costless usage. The second provides global connection, 
reliability and trustworthiness. Between them, several hybrid types can be identified. If a MANET 
gets occasional access to the internet, it can enhance its possibilities considerably. The same counts 
for nodes logged in the internet. If they can stay in contact after leaving the internet, their utility 
increases. The more volatile the MANET connections are the more online time is required to 
preserve persistent data. Therefore, it cannot be said how many online sessions are required for a 
certain service. We distinct hybrid networks between two basic types: with guaranteed service 
inside a certain period and without that guarantee.
External Incentives: We refer to incentives that stem from entities which do not participate in 
MANETs as external incentives. Four types can be distinguished:
-static and positive: the position of some is improved fixedly, e.g. by a prize 
-static and negative: the position of some is made worse fixedly, e.g. by excluding from a general 
remuneration 
-dynamic and positive: depending remuneration, e.g. convertibility into money 
-dynamic and negative: depending punishment, e.g. under the law 
 static dynamic 
positive Prize Convertibility 
negative Exclusion from general Remuneration Law and Punishment 
Table 2 External Incentive Types 
The static types may serve as an additional incentive in some special environments. However, the 
dynamic ones seem to be more important. Convertibility can transfer price stability into the network 
and make asymmetric structures possible. Laws can limit the design space for incentive patterns. 
For instance in Germany, we identified a couple of laws, concerning open mobile communication 
networks, especially in the areas of privacy and liability.
Duplicates: In the physical world, originals of documents or bonds may be easily distinguished 
from copies. But in the digital world, a notion of 'original' does not exist. Every string can be copied 
exactly. In order to cope with this problem, duplicate control could be performed by tamper-
resistant hardware or trusted infrastructure. Real MANET approaches have to rely on the power of a 
reputation system. Additionally, all transactions could be protocolled distributedly. Another 
inspiring idea is to accept duplicates by automatically dividing the value in half when used. But 
none of these approaches really serves as a substitute for originals, because all suffer from 
considerable drawbacks. 
3 Trust Based Incentive Patterns 
3.1 Collective Pattern 
Collectives are based on membership and static reputation. Total utility has priority over individual 
interests. In the social-economic area, pure and stable collectives cannot be found. Neither socialist 
models nor clubs or the military can do without other incentives like reputation, force or bonds in 
the long term. Therefore, this pattern can only be regarded as a basic incentive.
In MANETs, this pattern can be implemented in a very simple way, as only authentification is 
required. Hence, it consumes very little additional resources. But it neither provides load balance 
nor behavior control. This incentive may work in a small closed user group but in open 
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environments we need a more sophisticated approach. 
3.2 Community Pattern 
Communities can be found in many forms, like special interest groups or clubs. There, the 
participants do not pay for a service. Rather they trust each other that, in return for a provided 
service, other services can be consumed on occasion. A positive effect of trust is that it reduces the 
required amount of control respectively (Shionoya et al 2001). The reputation of those who often 
provide good services generally increases. Others who do not contribute much to the community are 
down-valued and avoided. The participants usually exchange their private information among them. 
The more complex and volatile the relations are, the harder to improve one’s reputation. Therefore, 
the scalability of communities is limited. It helps to spread faster the information about the own 
reputation in order to create attention. But since reputation is not a possession, its development is 
out of individual control (Voswinkel 2001). In spite of cooperative behavior, the reputation can 
change from positive to negative in a second, as the parameters for the valuation of others are 
unknown. This implies an inhibitive effect. 
In MANETs, the situation is quite similar. With a distributed reputation system, information about 
the willingness and ability to cooperate can be collected and exchanged. Design questions are which 
information should be processed, how should this information be diffused and how do we handle 
the problem of incorrect recommendations. If higher-order reputation (i.e., reputation regarding 
recommendational behavior) is to be applied, it is advisable to attach roles to the entities and to 
introduce a certain kind of hierarchy. This makes it easier to cope with coalition misbehavior and 
evidences because the transparency increases and reputations are more stable. 
4 Trade Based Incentive Patterns 
4.3 Barter Trade Pattern 
Barter trade has a certain importance in the field of foreign trade with developing countries and for 
(internet) barter communities (Möhring 1991). However, the use of this incentive pattern cannot be 
explained by traditional economic explanations (Schulze 1990). Moreover, its ability to conceal 
trade activities which do not conform to law or treaties, makes it interesting for particular parties. 
The popularity of barter communities can be explained by their capability to provide fun and 
contacts. Altogether, it can be emphasized that, in economic terms, this form of bilateral trade is 
always worse than multilateral trade with prices and markets. 
In MANETs, there are no structural differences. But it is not trivial to cope with the complexity of 
the required negotiations if we want to avoid human intervention. A definition of  the tradeable 
services should be known to all participants. Additionally, a model for the costs and the utility of 
each service has to be attached on each device. Only then, it is possible to decide about a 
transaction. To avoid a complicated multistage procedure, a simple negotiation with one request and 
one offer is to be preferred.
Combined with an adequate transaction protocol, this pattern is very robust, provides full 
compensation and scalability as the involved entities consume each other's resources 
simultaneously. But its applicability is limited by the presented constraints, i.e., the inefficiency and 
complexity. 
4.4 Bearer Bills/Notes Pattern 
These Patterns differ from their physical counterparts: instead of promising a payment in the future, 
a particular service is promised. Hence, the credit function isn't transferred, too. Hence, it is very 
similar to barter trade, only with a time shift of the action in return. This implicates the same 
4
problems. Additionally, it has to be emphasized, that these patterns cannot be regarded as secure as 
in the physical world. If the debtor does not fulfill, she can be punished only by the means of a 
reputation system. If handing-over of bonds is allowed, we have to cope with duplicates and cannot 
assert the strict rules for liability.  
At the expense of flexibility, bearer notes simplify negotiation compared to bills with three parties 
to coordinate. Some characteristics fit well to pure MANETs: there is no need for a dedicated bank 
and the nodes do not have to be equipped with a certain kind of means of payment as they only 
trade with their own resources. That is why liquidity of the whole network is always guaranteed.
With such incentive patterns, we gain flexibility compared to barter trade at the expense of new 
problems and complexity. 
4.5 Check Pattern 
This incentive pattern involves a bank and includes such different forms like credit cards, account 
transactions and checks. They are all very convenient to use and a high level of security can be 
provided. The credits can be used for arbitrary goods or services. The value depends on the 
underlying currency, which is controlled by the central bank. Checks can be circulated.
In MANETs, because of the lack of a dedicated bank, other approaches propose tamper-resistant 
hardware or occasional access to a trusted server (OON). Another problem for MANETs is how to 
equip the entities with sufficient credits and how to stabilize the value of this artificial settlement 
currency. A solution could be to introduce convertibility into real money, but then there exists an 
enhanced incentive to manipulate. Additionally, infrastructure to secure the conversion is required. 
That is why we call convertibility an external incentive. Without that, inherent agents are able to 
absorb large amounts of credits such that the means of payment run short. But even in networks 
with exclusively symmetric entities, prices may suffer from high volatility. The reason for this is 
that the amount of means of payment and the amount of available resources do not develop 
synchronously. Therefore, the entities have to cope with a high level of insecurity about the value of 
their credits. Hence, it becomes virtually impossible to calculate adequate prices. It has to be 
emphasized that this pattern does not serve well for pure MANETs, MANETs with special 
hardware or OONs if the amount of available resources is not stable and we do without 
convertibility. A general application cannot be recommended.
4.6 Banknote Pattern 
Banknotes have similar characteristics like checks, but their nominal value is fixed and they can 
circulate anonymously because they cannot be counterfeited (almost). This does not hold true for 
the application to MANETs. The problem with duplicates cannot be solved without considerable 
constraints. Therefore, this pattern appears to be very unattractive and does not provide any 
advantage compared to check pattern. 
5 The Share Pattern 
5.1 Relationship with Trust/Trade Based Patterns 
In this section, we introduce an incentive pattern which has no exact counterpart in the physical 
world. It is best approximated by company shares which belong to the trade-based group. But as the 
valuation of shares depends mostly on the expectations of investors about the company's future 
competitiveness, it also includes a trust component. Due to the versatility of its use, the stress can 
be mainly on trade or on trust. 
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5.2 Characteristics 
To a company, emitting shares has different aspects besides finance: the market participants on 
stock exchanges value the shares corresponding to their expectations. Thus, there is an active 
interaction between the company and its investors. Secondly, the company creates its own currency 
which it can use to buy others without using its liquidity. Shares are usually negotiable and their 
value is volatile. 
5.3 Transferring Shares to Ad hoc Networks 
What we want to transfer to MANETs is a kind of personal currency as a means of payment and the 
valuation function in order to create transparency. This can be realized by considering each entity as 
a company which carries 100% of itself when first entering the network. While consuming 
resources of others, it has to remunerate them with shares. In this way, the entities can build up 
portfolios. In MANETs, the values of these portfolios cannot be determined by stock exchanges. 
Moreover, we need a mathematical approach. The resulting interconnection between the entities has 
the structure of Markov chains. If we can calculate the stationary distribution, the results can be 
interpreted as the values. To guarantee such a distribution, a dummy entity which exchanges equal 
shares with each entity has to be added to the calculation.  
If the trust component is to be emphasized, each entity collects information about the portfolios of 
others for itself and tries to approximate their value. Otherwise all reported portfolios are combined 
to a share matrix on a particular entity (see table 3-6). Then all entities receive uniformly and 
correctly calculated values.  
 A B C 
A 0.85 0.1 0 
B 0.15 0.85 0 
C 0 0.05 1 
Table 3 Example of a Share matrix with 3 entities 
 SI A B C 
SI 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
A 0.25 0.6 0.1 0 
B 0.25 0.15 0.6 0 
C 0.25 0 0.05 0.75 
Table 4 Example after extending with dummy entity 
 SI A B C 
SI 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.250 
A 0.216 0.216 0.216 0.216 
B 0.237 0.237 0.237 0.237 
C 0.297 0.297 0.297 0.297 
Table 5 Multi-propagated matrix 
 SI A B C 
Valuation 1.000 0.862 0.948 1.190 
Table 6 Results to publish 
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The latter procedure is accompanied by several problems besides the additional overhead. To avoid 
manipulation of the messages, adequate cryptographic mechanisms have to be applied. To secure 
correct calculation and publication, distributed control is required. To double-check the reporting of 
correct portfolios, all entities should also give proof of their emitted shares. Misbehavior has to be 
punished by a reputation system. 
5.4 Advanced Design Alternatives 
When we design such a pattern, we have to decide whether we want the emitted shares to exist 
forever on other devices or whether we prefer to limit their period of validity. The first alternative is 
a straightforward approach. In the course of time, the number of shareholders increases constantly, 
although the possibility to trade in one's own shares exists. The portfolio may contain a large 
number of different shares whose respective entity doesn't exist any more and therefore does not 
contribute to its value. This problem disappears if we apply time limits. Then, we only have to 
administrate and to report the valid shares. The length of the period has to be defined generally or 
negotiated individually. As a prerequisite, the participating devices have to synchronize their local 
time. 
An advanced approach is to implement a standard analysis tool to be able to collect hints about the 
cooperative behavior of other entities by supervising the development of the respective portfolio 
valuations. This can accelerate the flow of information and help to identify misbehaving entities. 
For instance, a declining portfolio value could indicate, that the respective entity behaves lavishly 
or, even worse, that no other entity wants to consume its resources because of its bad reputation. On 
the other hand, a constantly rising portfolio value could indicate that the respective entity provides a 
very competitive service or action which attracts much interest. 
6 The Choice of Appropriate Patterns 
6.1 The Situation in Economics Environments 
Due to the rising importance of attention and reputation, large communities are proliferating in 
many areas. Where people come together regularly to share ideas, this kind of incentive may be 
sufficient. Since neither physical prerequisites nor explicit negotiations are required, it can be used 
always and everywhere. But it suffers from limited scalability and effectiveness.  
Although barter trade is both, scalable and effective, its use cannot be recommended under normal 
conditions since transaction costs are very high. Only in the absence of a stable currency, the use of 
this pattern can be justified. 
All other trade-based incentive patterns depend on a stable currency underlying them. 
Bearer bills and notes are only used between companies with commercial relations. Trust in the 
financial strength of the debtor is a prerequisite. Their most important task is to save liquidity. An 
important property of these bonds is that they can be generated without any physical requirements.  
Checks, however, depend on the availability of banks, which in commercial environments normally 
can be taken for granted. The convenient use of checks boosts their popularity but transactions are 
usually accompanied by fees.  
The handling of banknotes often causes higher transaction costs compared to checks, as their values 
are fixed and they have to be taken around with one. Nonetheless, they have unique characteristics 
which justify their use. They can be exchanged by everyone anonymously and, for small amounts, 
they are still the best choice. 
Company shares serve for many purposes. But usually, they are not used as a means of payment. 
Moreover they help the emitting company to finance its risks. The shares can also be used, to buy 
other companies. It has to be considered that their value is generally very volatile. 
A quick overview of these incentive patterns is given in table 7. 
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 Community Barter Trade Bearer Bonds Checks Banknotes Shares 
Areas for 
Applica-tion
mutuality and trust 
based relations 
internet platforms 




means of credit 
between companies
intl. trade 
means of cashless 
payment 
means of payment 
















mayor, but not in 
everyday trade 
Advan-tages no physical 
requirements
no negotiations 
security due to 
instant exchange of 
services 



































risk of transport 
investment risk 
generally not 
suitable for  
payments 
Table 7 Overview of the presented economic incentive patterns 
6.2 The Situation in Ad-hoc Networks 
Due to its minimal consumption of resources, the use of the collective pattern can be justified, 
although its competitiveness is very limited. In some situations, no stronger incentive is necessary, 
e.g., if the activity in the network is very low or the participants know each other well. 
Another basic incentive is the community pattern. Its main goal is to avoid misbehavior. To a 
certain extend it also remunerates very cooperative behavior. Since the valuation is done by the 
other entities, there is no control over one's reputation. 
Full remuneration is guaranteed by barter trade. But the typically very complex negotiations cannot 
be transferred well to MANETs. This further contributes to the high transaction costs of this pattern. 
In special volatile environments with symmetric relations and few well-defined actions, its usage 
could be considered. 
Bearer bills and notes make it easier to find a transaction partner, but the negotiations are even more 
complex, since more parameters are involved. Additionally, a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is 
required and the fulfillment of the promise is not guaranteed. In environments with low volatility, 
this pattern could be the better choice compared to barter. 
Banknotes and checks depend on the stability of the underlying currency which cannot be 
guaranteed without central bank control. As the advantages of banknotes cannot be transferred to 
MANETs, their usage cannot be justified. Checks serve as a standard means of payment if the 
participants trust in their value. In environments with inherent agents, the amount of means of 
payment in the network can run short. Therefore, this pattern can only be used in symmetric 
environments. A still unsolved problem is how to equip the entities with adequate amounts of 
credits.
If we apply shares, this problem does not exist since every entity owns 100% of its own. Thus,  this 
type of means of payment guarantees network liquidity. The value of single shares will often be 
rather volatile but, within a mixed portfolio, relative stability should be achieved. This is a versatile 
approach with many applications. But it does not work well with volatile relations and needs 
adequate cryptographic mechanisms. 
A quick overview about these incentive patterns gives table 8. 
 Community Barter Trade Bearer Bonds Checks Banknotes Shares 
8
 Community Barter Trade Bearer Bonds Checks Banknotes Shares 
Coope-ration
Incentive 
intention of other 
entities to provide 
resources increases
action in return of 
equal value 
promised action in 
return of equal 
value
arbitrarily usable 
credits of equal 
value
arbitrarily usable 
means of payment 
of equal value 
enhancement of 
portfolio allows for 






suitable objects for 
barter
combination of two 
utilities 
symmetry 
suitable objects to 
promise
combination of two 
utilities 
trust in debtor and 
drawer
availability of a 
bank (dedicated or 
distributed)
trust in acceptance 
and stability 
availability of a 
legitimated entity 
for emission 






















full settlement not 
required
main goal is to 
avoid misbehavior
missing of PKI 
high volatility 











means of payment 
not desired 
Effects limited incentive 
compatibility 
insecurity due to 




























Table 8 Overview about the presented MANET Incentive Patterns 
6.3 Example: Cooperation Incentives for a Discovery Overlay 
In this chapter, we examine which incentive patterns suit best for the discovery layer with service 
ring overlay in a MANET (Ponz 2002, Klein et al 2003) in the context of the DIANE project (Klein 
2003). There are several characteristic properties: 
- roles/hierarchies: Service Access Points (SAP) and Ring Members (RM) 
- a stable logical structure with predominantly unidirectional communication 
- no physical infrastructure 
- no special hardware 
- initial public key equipment of devices 
A special property of the discovery layer is the possibility to misbehave by blocking advertisements 
or service requests of competitors. Based on these prerequisites, inferior pattern types are 
- collective, because it provides too little incentive 
- barter trade, because of the unidirectional communication 
- checks and banknotes, because they depend on unavailable banks 
The remaining patterns have to be compared: 
Certainly, a competitive community pattern would provide protection against misbehavior and 
motivate cooperation to a certain extend. But the lack of transparency appears to be a disadvantage.
Bearer Bills and Notes are explicit remunerations. They are MANET compatible and fit well to the 
stable structures. The available actions are well-defined, which makes negotiations simpler. 
However, it cannot be expected that an entity always can offer an action which the requesting entity 
will need in the near future. Since the actions on this layer are crucial for the whole network, this 
drawback hardly can be accepted. 
Shares provide a basic incentive to support each other through its connection capabilities. The value 
calculation provides transparency. Finally, the SAPs suit very well for the task of calculating and 
broadcasting the portfolio values. The overhead hasn't too bad effects, since there are relatively few 
transactions on this layer. Thus, the Shares Pattern appears to be superior. We prefer the personal 
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currency alternative in this case.  
7 Conclusion 
We showed, that it is important to classify convertibility into money as an external incentive. Real 
MANET approaches have to do without this feature. Since in MANETs, neither infrastructure, nor 
fixed hierarchies, nor special hardware exists, not all aspects of physical world incentives can be 
transferred. Duplicates and volatility are two main items with which we had to cope. 
The Community pattern motivates activity well but suffers from the lack of control about one's 
remuneration. For barter trade, it is hard, to find a suitable environment for its application, as it 
normally is very inefficient. We could prove that checks do not work well in MANETs because the 
artificial currency is not controlled and the adequate equipment of entities with credits is non-trivial. 
Therefore, stable prizes and liquidity are not guaranteed. Even worse are banknotes. Their unique 
properties in the physical world are not transferable.
A new approach are shares. They remind us of the community pattern, because the values are 
similar to reputations. But they are also similar to checks, with the difference, that every entity 
carries its own currency. Because only own shares are traded, there is no need for bank entities. 
Finally, the arising interconnection between the nodes serves as a basic incentive for mutual 
support.
To further gain insights about MANET incentive patterns, mainly community, bearer bond and 
share incentive schemes have to be designed and tested in different environments. They all have 
specific advantages, thus a universal pattern cannot be expected.
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Glossary
Advertisement  a program language neutral (XML- )document, that represents a 
network resource (data, service, device). 
Required for service discovery in ad hoc 
networks 
Convertibility  the ability of a (settlement) currency to be exchanged into another 
outside the system 
Volatility  a measure of the dynamic instability of network structures, 
characterized by the movement in space and their 
log-in and log-out behavior.
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Excluded Aspects in 2.2 
Roles: Every node in ad hoc networks can change arbitrarily between the principal and agent roles 
as they are all with equal rights. In contrast in the physical world we mostly find hierarchies or 
organizational structures with defined roles. 
Absence of Infrastructure: While in the physical world, there are lots of different trustworthy 
institutions like banks, judges or notaries, MANETs lack of such dedicated entities. Thus, they can 
only be realized distributedly. This implicates less reliability and information persistency.  
Efficiency: As resources are scarce in MANETs the focus while designing an incentive scheme has 
to be on efficiency. The additional utility through motivated cooperation must be bigger than the 
cost for the needed resources for deploying the scheme. Means to keep schemes lean are to avoid as 
many parameters for negotiations as possible. Secondly, based on the surrounding, should be 
estimated, which type of resource is most expensive, because often can be chosen between a trade-
off for example between more calculation or more communication. 
Authentication: Because of the absence of authorities new approaches to be able to identify each 
other are definitely required. Besides tamper-resistant hardware, devices could be equipped once 
with a public key pair before entering an ad hoc network. The creation of keys inside a network 
carries several problems, although this would be a real MANET approach. 
Coalition Misbehavior: The most severe danger to the effectiveness of an incentive scheme are 
coordinated attacks by a coalition. As MANETs are mostly relatively small and without 
supervision, a malicious coalition often can easily apply profitable misbehavior as long as they are 
undiscovered. Hence, individual entities should prefer not to trust too much in others and evidences 
have to be very trustworthy to avoid the communication of faked ones. 
